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Case No. 8743 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CARL EMIL TREUTLE, 
.............................. ~ --
c' .,.r'- o:,-,-:~-------· ·-~< ""' J., .-... ~.,.~ro·rr:? ~. -
-vs.-
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN DANl 0 1958 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CARL EMIL TREUTLE, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN Case No. 8743 
AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, and VIOLA M. 
TREUTLE, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Defendants agree generally with the introductory 
statement and the Statement of Facts set forth in the 
brief of plaintiff. However, there are certain matters 
which should be set forth specifically. As indicated at 
Page 6 of the plaintiff's brief the Writ which was obtain-
ed by plaintiff was in the nature of a Writ of Certiorari. 
A Writ of Certiorari is now governed by Rule 65-B 
(b) (2), which reads as follows: 
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" ( 2) Where an inferior tribunal, board or 
officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded 
his jurisdiction or abused its discretion." 
Rule 65-B (e) provides the procedure by which a 
Writ of Certiorari is obtained and restricts the review by 
this Court in the following language: 
" 'The review by the Court issuing the writ 
shall not be extended further than to determine 
whether the inferior tribunal board or officer has 
regularly pursued the authority of such tribunal, 
board, or officer.' " 
In addition to the Rules covering the extraordinary 
Writs, defendants also feel that it is necessary as a pre-
liminary matter to set forth the rule governing the in-
vocation of jurisdiction in civil matters. 
Rule 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure reads as fol-
lows: 
" (a) How Commenced. A civil action is com-
menced (1) by filing a complaint with the court, 
or (2) by the service of a summons. ***" 
Rule 3 (c) covering the time of jurisdiction reads as 
follows: 
" (c) Time of J urisdietion. The court shall 
have jurisdiction fron1 the time of filing the com-
plaint or the service of the summons." 
Concerning the issuance of su1nmons that matter is 
governed by Rule 4 (a), as follows: 
" (a) Issuanee of Sununons. The summons 
may be signed and issued by the plaintiff or his 
attorney. A sun1mons shall be deemed to have 
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issued when placed in the hands of a qualified 
person for the purpose of service. Separate sum-
monses may be issued and served." 
Rule 4 (b) requires that the Summons must is.sue 
within three months from the date of the filing of the 
complaint. 
The record before this Court shows that the summons 
was actually received by the Sheriff of New York City 
on the 19th of December, 1957, one day prior to the ex-
piration of three months from the date of the filing of the 
complaint. 
Concerning the persons who are authorized to serve 
Summons, Rule 4 (d) sets forth the various authorized 
party. Subsection 2 of said Rule reads as follows: 
"Rule 4 (d) (2) In another state or United 
States territory by the sheriff of the county where 
the service is made, or by his deputy, or by a 
United States marshal or his deputy." 
In addition to the Rule.s governing the commence-
menlt •of actions and the creati·on of jurisdiction, an addi-
tional Statute of the State of Utah is applicable and it is 
Rule 80 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which reads as 
follows: 
''Rule 80 (b) Duties. It shall he the ~duty of 
the reporter to attend all sessions of the court, 
and to record in full ~the evidence given and all 
proceedings had therein, including proceedings at 
any pretrial, except when the judge dispenses with 
his services in a particular cause or with respect 
to a portion of the proceedings thereof. The re-
porter shall file with the clerk forthwith the 
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original record required to be taken at a trial or 
hearing, and, when requested so to do, shall with 
reasonable diligence furnish any party a trans-
cript of the record of the evidence and proceed-
ings, or any part thereof, upon payment of the 
fees required by law. Any transcript of the evi-
dence of proceedings shall be made in accordance 
with the requirements of subdivision (d) of Rule 
10, relating to the type of paper, kind of type, 
and margins of pleadings and other papers filed 
with the clerk.'' 
Rule 80 is similar in its provisions with the Judicial 
Code provision which provides for shorthand reporters. 
The Judicial Code provision is U.C.A. 1953, 78-56-2. 
"78-56-2. Duties. - It shall be the duty of the 
shorthand reporter to attend all s·ess~ons of the 
court, and to take full stenographic notes of the 
evidence given and of all proceedings had therein, 
except when the judge dispenses with his service.s 
in a particular cause or with respect to a portion 
of the proceedings thereof. The reporter shall 
file with the clerk forth,vith the original steno-
graphic notes required to be taken at a trial or 
hearing, and, when requested so to do, shall with 
reasonable diligence furnish the defendant in a 
criminal cau.se, and a party to a civil cause, a 
transcript of the stenographic notes of the evi-
dence and proceedings or any part thereof, upon 
payment of the fees herein provided." 
SUl\IniARY OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT WAS 
PROPERLY INVOKED AND EXISTED AT ALL TIMES 
DURING THE PROCEEDINGS. 
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POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT EXCEED ITS JURIS-
DICTION OR ABUSE ITS DISCRETION, BUT REGULARLY 
PURSUED ITS AUTHORITY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT WAS 
PROPERLY INVOKED AND EXISTED AT ALL TIMES 
DURING THE PROCEEDINGS. 
The primary attack upon jurisdiction of the District 
Court seems to be addressed, by the brief of the plaintiff, 
to a claim that the Summons did not issue within three 
months from the date of the filing of the complaint. The 
facts concerning the issuance of the Summons and the 
commencement of the action seem to be undisputed. They 
are: (1) The complaint was filed on S~eptemher 20th, 
1956; (2) The summons is dated December 17, 1956 and 
was in the hands of the Sheriff of New York on December 
19th, 1956 (R. 10). 
The return on the Summons by the Under Sheriff 
in charge of the New County Division, shows that effort 
was made to serve defendant but his place of sojourn 
could not be ascertained. 
The summons was in the hands of a qualified person 
for the purpose of service on the 19th of December, 1956. 
Rule 4 (a) defined the summons as being issued when 
placed in the hands of a qualified person for the purpose 
of service. Rule 4 (d) (2) defines a qualified person when 
the service is to be made in a State other than the State 
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of Utah, as the Sheriff of the County where the service 
is to be made, or by his deputy. The return on service 
of Summons shows that the deputy sheriff of the County 
of New York had in his hands a Summons and com-
plaint to be served on the 19th of December. 
Rule 3 (a) provides that where actions are com-
menced by the filing of the complaint, Summons must 
issue thereon within three months from the date of filing. 
It must be served within one year. The action was com-
menced in accordance with Rule 3 (a) by the filing of the 
complaint and jurisdiction continued thereafter under 
Rule 3 (c). 
The language of the Sections is so clear and unam-
biguous as to make it unnecessary to resort to anything 
but the ordinary rules of construction to determine just 
what the intent of the Legislature was. See Reese v. 
Judges of District Court of Salt Lake County, 52 Utah 
520, 175 Pac. 601. 
The records show that the publication of Summons 
was completed on February 8, 1957. On the 28th day 
of February, 1957, twenty days had expired. It .appears 
that on the 5th of March, 1957 counsel for defendant, 
Viola M. Treutle, appeared in Court; that the default 
of Carl Emil Treutle could be entered and a judgment 
based on evidence theretofore adduced before the Court 
would be proper. 
As far as defendants .are able to discern plaintiff 
doe.s not attack the regularity of the service of summons 
by publication. 
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It is respectfully submitted that the jurisdiction of 
the District Court was properly invoked on the date that 
the complaint was filed. Jurisdiction by publication of 
summons was perfected. Juris diction existed at all times 
when orders were made and .actions taken by the District 
Court. 
POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT EXCEED ITS JURIS-
DICTION OR ABUSE ITS DISCRETION, BUT REGULARLY 
PURSUED ITS AUTHORITY. 
No .special appearance was ever made by the plaintiff 
in the lower court to quash the service of summons or to 
object to the procedures which were followed by the Dis-
trict Court. It is not contended that there was not such a 
remedy. The District Court would, in compliance with 
the law, if the motion to quash the service of summons 
was well taken, grant such motion. If it did not grant 
the motion then an appeal from its refusal would lie. 
The normal remedy of appeal existed at all times. 
It was adequate and speedy. The kind of errors which 
plaintiff claims the Court fell into could have been raised 
on an appeal simply by following the normal procedures 
prescribed by the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
This Court has very recently spoken upon the ques-
tion of availability of the special writs where the party 
seeking the writ has permitted his time for appeal to run 
without taking action. 
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In the case of Anderson v. Baker, 5 Utah 2nd 33, 296 
Pac. 283, this Court had before it a petition for perman-
ent Writ of c·ertiorari to set aside a decree and to prevent 
the District Court from holding a father who refused to 
sup·port his minor children in contempt. The Court, 
speaking through District Judge Wahlquist, set do"rn 
the rule of the law applicable to the facts before the 
Court in this case in the following language: 
"The case before us is of a new category. Here 
the court below had jurisdiction of the parties 
and the subject matter. There was a right of ap-
peal that was, if timely used, an adequate remedy 
at law. The right of appeal expired and now the 
petitioner complains of error. 
"If there was once an adequate remedy by an 
appeal and the party permits it to lapse, he does 
so at his peril. Robinson v. City Court for City 
of Ogden, 112 Utah 36, 185 P. 2d 256. Certainly 
to hold that extraordinary "\VTits will issue to re-
view because there is error, would largely be de-
stroying the rules requiring timely appeal." 
Even assuming that the claim of plaintiff is correct 
that there was no ~'legal evidence" available for the Court 
to act upon, still such a deficiency in the trial court pro-
cedure would not be available on a ''T rit of Certiorari. 
This court has held that the special writ will not be 
available where the only que.stion is whether or not the 
findings and judg1nent of the District Court is supported 
by evidence. 
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In the early case of Rose v. District Court of Millard 
Co., 67 Utah 526, 248 Pac. 486, a criminal prosecution re-
sulted in the conviction of the plaintiff and he sought, 
through the use of the Writ of Certiorari, to show cer-
tain irregularities in the trial court and to raise the ques-
tion of lack of evidence to support the trial court's judg-
ment. Thi.s Court dismissed the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari and stated as follows : 
"The third contention, contained in subdivi-
sion (c) that the court erred in refusing to dismiss 
the action after the state had rested, because of 
insufficiency of evidence to justify a verdict of 
guilty, cannot be considered in certiorari proceed-
ings. In certiorari proceedings the Court will not 
look into the record to determine or ascertain 
the lack of evidence to support the trial court's 
judgment. Pincock v. Kimball, 64 Utah 4, 228 
Pac. 221." 
Pincock v. Kimball, 64 Utah 4, 228 Pac. 221, is one 
of the landmark cases on Writs of Certiorari. It involved 
the actions of the Sheriff of a County in selling and seiz-
ing property which was sought by .a civil litigant. Review 
of the District Court's procedure was sought through a 
special writ. Concerning the issuance of the writ this 
Court stated as follows (P. 10): 
"In Rowher v. District Court, 41 Utah at page 
284, 125 Pac. 671, 673, the Court says : 'The Court 
having acquired jurisdiction of the estate, we can-
not in this proceeding, inquire into the regularity 
of the proceedings, or whether the court may have 
erred in matters of law when the acts constituting 
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such assumed irregularities were not without or 
in excess of jurisdiction. 
"The great weight of authority in this country 
is to the effect that under statutes such as ours 
a writ of review will extend no further than to 
determine whether the inferior court or tribunal 
has exceeded its jurisdiction either by want of 
having acquired jurisdiction of the parties or not 
having jurisdiction of the subject matter." 
The case then states that in two recent cases the 
court had refused to follow the early cases of Gilbert v. 
Board of P. & F. Com'rs, 11 Utah 378, 40 Pac. 264, and 
S. L. C. etc., Co. v. Salt Lake City, 24 Utah 282, 67 Pac. 
791. In commenting on the cases before the Court, it 
said: 
"In one instance a writ was issued based upon 
the claim or contention of the petitioner that there 
was no evidence in the trial court to support the 
judgment. In that case, after the writ had been 
issued, the court declined to hear further argu-
ment, and dismissed the writ. In the other in-
stance the application was based upon a like claim. 
The court refused to issue the writ; upon the 
theory that it could not inquire into that question 
but was confined to a determination only of 
whether the inferior court had jurisdiction and 
had regularly pursued the same. 
"As indicated, it appears fron1 the record 
in this case, and it is recited in the judgment, that 
the district court of Weber County had jurisdic-
tion of the parties then before it, and had jurisdic-
tion of the subject matter, and that the judgment 
is regular upon its face. 'Recitals of jurisdictional 
facts in a record or decree ilnport verity and bind-
ing effect, and 1nust be so treated when attacked 
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collaterally.' Hoagland v. Hoagland, 19 Utah 103, 
57 Pac. 20. The court cannot therefore examine 
the findings to determine whether such findings 
support the decree or judgment in question." 
In one of the great decisions concerning the special 
writ and which was particularly concerned with a Writ 
of Prohibition was decided by this Court in a decision 
written by Justice Wolfe. It is Atwood v. Cox, 88 Utah 
437, 55 Pac. 2d 377. In the decision Justice Wolfe ex-
haustively discu.sses the special Writ of Prohibition but 
the language which he uses is equally applicable to the 
Writ of Certiorari or any other of the special writs de-
signed for the purpose of reviewing a lower court hold-
Ing. This Court held as follows (P. 385): 
"A finding by the Court on a matter it has 
jurisdiction of, without evidence, is error and 
not in any way jurisdictional." 
None of the matters cited by plaintiff in its brief 
in any way seem to be more than claimed errors on the 
part of the trial court. It is not admitted that they were 
errors. 
The primary objection apparently seems to be that 
the Court when it received the evidence of the defendant, 
Viola Treutle, did not require stenographic notes of the 
testimony. 
Rule 80 and U.C.A. 1953, 78-56-2 set forth clearly 
the requirements for stenographic notes of evidence and 
other matters received by the Court. It is clear that it is 
left to the discretion of the Court as to whether or not 
stenographic notes shall be required. 
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The basic question might then resolve itself into 
whether or not the Court abused its discretion in not re-
questing notes, and is such error available on a Writ of 
Certiorari. 
This matter has been very clearly passed upon in 
the case of State v. District Court of Second Judicial Dis-
trict, et al., 105 Mont. 510, 7 4 Pac. 2d 8. 
The Statutes of the State of Montana are similar in 
all their provisions to the provisions of Rule 80 of Rules 
of Civil Procedure and U.C.A. 1953, 78-56-2. The Mon-
tana Supreme Court ruling should be persuasive in con-
sidering the question of whether or not a failure by the 
District Court to require certain evidence to be recorded 
by stenographic notes is error. 
The Montana Court was concerned with the very 
same situation now before this Court. A father was at-
tempting, through Writ of Certiorari, to have the Su-
preme Court of Montana review the appointment of a 
guardian for his son and to set aside the appointment as 
made by the District Court. He did not appear in the 
proceedings when the Guardian 'vas appointed and made 
no attempt to appeal from the appoint1nent. 
The Supr(\me Court of ~fontana held that where 
there was no reque~t n1ade by a party for the recording 
of testimony through stenographic notes it was not an 
abuse of discretion for the Court not to require them. 
The decision holds, ho,yeyer, that if a party made a re-
quest for a record to be n1ade by stenographic notes, and 
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the Court refused to require a stenographic record, it 
would be an abuse of discretion. 
Many times the occurrences in District Courts have 
not been recorded and, in fact, this Court in the case of 
State v. Baum, 47 Utah 7, 151 Pac. 518, noted specifically 
the regular and cu.stomary practice in the State not to 
lU,tve the court reporter present during the argument of 
the case to the Jury. A similar practice apparently pre-
vailed in Montana. In State v. Hogan, 100 Mont. 434, 49 
Pac. 2d 446, the Supreme Court of Montana commented 
upon the fact that there was no stenographic record of 
closing arguments in a criininal case. It held that where 
there was the procedure available of perfecting a bill of 
exceptions and having it settled to preserve the rights 
of the parties no abuse of discretion was found where the 
Court failed to require stenographic record of arguments 
to the jury. 
Counsel has researched the most recent holdings 
concerning the requir~ement of stenographic notes ~and 
other than the Montana cases, supra, there have not 
been any cases decided directly on the point now pre-
sented to this Court. 
In the light of the prior holdings concerning the 
right to raise purely evidentiary matters on a Writ of 
Certiorari, and the clear language of U.C.A. 1953, 78-56-2 
and Rule 80, is respectfully submitted that the failure 
of the Court to require stenographic notes of the testi-
mony of the defendant, Viola Treutle, was not an abuse 
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of discretion and was not error, and even if error, could 
not be raised in this Court on a Writ of Certiorari. 
CONCLUSION 
It is resp-ectfully submitted that this Court should 
recall the temporary Writ of Certiorari heretofore issued 
in the above entitled action and should dismiss the com-
plaint of plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KING and HUGHES 
Attorneys for defendant 
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